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Abstract—Researchers have studied Internet censorship for
nearly as long as attempts to censor contents have taken place.
Most studies have however been limited to a short period of time
and/or a few countries; the few exceptions have traded off detail
for breadth of coverage. Collecting enough data for a compre-
hensive, global, longitudinal perspective remains challenging.
In this work, we present ICLab, an Internet measurement
platform specialized for censorship research. It achieves a new
balance between breadth of coverage and detail of measurements,
by using commercial VPNs as vantage points distributed around
the world. ICLab has been operated continuously since late
2016. It can currently detect DNS manipulation and TCP packet
injection, and overt “block pages” however they are delivered.
ICLab records and archives raw observations in detail, making
retrospective analysis with new techniques possible. At every stage
of processing, ICLab seeks to minimize false positives and manual
validation.
Within 53,906,532 measurements of individual web pages,
collected by ICLab in 2017 and 2018, we observe blocking of
3,602 unique URLs in 60 countries. Using this data, we compare
how different blocking techniques are deployed in different
regions and/or against different types of content. Our longitudinal
monitoring pinpoints changes in censorship in India and Turkey
concurrent with political shifts, and our clustering techniques
discover 48 previously unknown block pages. ICLab’s broad
and detailed measurements also expose other forms of network
interference, such as surveillance and malware injection.
I. Introduction
For the past 25 years, the Internet has been an important
forum for people who wish to communicate, access information,
and express their opinions. It has also been the theater of
a struggle with those who wish to control who can be
communicated with, what information can be accessed, and
which opinions can be expressed. National governments in
particular are notorious for their attempts to impose restrictions
on online communication [29]. These attempts have had
unintentional international consequences [9], [15], [56], [78],
and have raised questions about export policy for network
management products with legitimate uses (e.g., virus detection
and protection of confidential information) that can also be
used to violate human rights [26].
The literature is rich with studies of various aspects of
Internet censorship [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [15], [17], [23],
[25], [26], [34], [36], [37], [43], [48], [56], [61], [64], [65],
[66], [72], [76], [78], [79], [88], [89] but a global, longitudinal
baseline of censorship covering a variety of censorship methods
∗Authors contributed equally
remains elusive. We highlight three key challenges that must
be addressed to make progress in this space:
Challenge 1: Access to Vantage Points. With few ex-
ceptions,1 measuring Internet censorship requires access to
“vantage point” hosts within the region of interest.
The simplest way to obtain vantage points is to recruit
volunteers [37], [43], [73], [80]. Volunteers can run software
that performs arbitrary network measurements from each
vantage point, but recruiting more than a few volunteers per
country and retaining them for long periods is difficult. Further,
volunteers may be exposed to personal risks for participating
in censorship research.
More recently, researchers have explored alternatives, such
as employing open DNS resolvers [66], [72], echo servers [79],
Web browsers visiting instrumented websites [17], and TCP
side channels [32], [65]. These alternatives reduce the risk
to volunteers, and can achieve broader, longer-term coverage
than volunteer labor. However, they cannot perform arbitrary
network measurements; for instance, open DNS resolvers can
only reveal DNS-based censorship.
Challenge 2: Understanding What to Test. Testing a single
blocked URL can reveal that a censorship system exists within
a country, but does not reveal the details of the censorship
policy, how aggressively it is enforced, or all of the blocking
techniques used. Even broad test lists, like those maintained
by the Citizen Lab [22], may be insufficient [28]. Web pages
are often short-lived, so tests performed in the present may be
misleading [84].
Challenge 3: Reliable Detection. Censors can prevent access
to content in several different ways. For instance, censors
may choose to supply “block pages” for some material, which
explicitly notify the user of censorship, and mimic site outages
for other material (see §II-C) [27], [43].
Many recent studies focus on a single technique [17], [32],
[65], [66], [72], [79]. This is valuable but incomplete, because
censors may combine different techniques to filter different
types of content.
As the Internet evolves and new modes of access appear
(e.g., mobile devices), censorship evolves as well, and monitor-
ing systems must keep up [6], [59]. Ad-hoc detection strategies
without rigorous evaluation are prone to false positives [89].
1China filters inbound as well as outbound traffic, making external
observation simpler.
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For example, detecting filtering via DNS manipulation requires
care to deal with CDNs [66], [72] and detection of block pages
requires taking regional differences in content into account [48].
A. Contributions
We present ICLab, a censorship measurement platform that
tackles these challenges. ICLab primarily uses commercial
Virtual Private Network servers (VPNs) as vantage points, after
validating that they are in their advertised locations. VPNs offer
long-lived, reliable vantage points in diverse locations, but still
allow detailed data collection from all levels of the network
stack. ICLab also deploys volunteer-operated devices (VODs)
in a handful of locations.
ICLab is extensible, allowing us to implement new experi-
ments when new censorship technologies emerge, update the
URLs that are tested over time, and re-analyze old data as
necessary. To date ICLab has only been used to monitor
censorship of the web, but it could easily be adapted to monitor
other application-layer protocols (e.g., using techniques such
as those in Molavi Kakhki et al. [59]). Besides ICLab itself,
and its collected data, we offer the following contributions:
Global, longitudinal monitoring. Since its launch in 2016,
ICLab has been continuously conducting measurements in 62
countries, covering 234 autonomous systems (ASes) and testing
over 45,000 unique URLs over the course of more than two
years. The platform has detected over 3,500 unique URLs
blocked using a variety of censorship techniques. We discuss
our discoveries in more detail in Section V.
Enhanced detection accuracy. ICLab collects data from all
levels of the network stack and detects multiple different types
of network interference. By comparing results across all the
detection techniques, we can discover inaccuracies in each and
refine them. We have eliminated all false positives from our
block page detector. DNS manipulation detection achieves a
false positive rate on the order of 10−4 when cross-checked
against the block page detector (see Section IV-A). Similar
cross-checking shows a negligible false positive rate for TCP
packet injection (see Section IV-B).
Semi-automated block page detection. We have developed a
new technique for discovering both variations on known block
pages and previously unknown block pages. These explicit
notifications of censorship are easy for a human to identify, but
machine classifiers have trouble distinguishing them from other
short HTML documents expressing an error message. Existing
systems rely on hand-curated sets of regular expressions, which
are brittle and tedious to update.
ICLab includes two novel machine classifiers for short error
messages, designed to facilitate manual review of groups of
suspicious messages, rather than directly deciding whether
each is a block page. Using these classifiers we discovered 48
previously undetected block page signatures from 13 countries.
We describe these classifiers and their discoveries in more
detail in Section IV-C.
II. Background
Here we briefly review the techniques used to block access
to information online, two different options for implementation,
and how the censor’s goals affect their implementation choices.
A. Network-level blocking techniques
Abstractly, all attempts to interfere with website access
are man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on communications
between a web browser and server. Depending on the location
and configuration of their MITM devices, censors may interfere
with traffic outside the borders of their own authority [15], [36],
[78].
DNS manipulation. When visiting a website, the user’s
browser must first resolve the web server’s IP address using
DNS. DNS traffic is unencrypted, and less than 1% of it is
authenticated [81]. Using either DNS servers they control, or
packet injection from routers, censors can forge responses carry-
ing DNS error codes such as “host not found” (NXDOMAIN),
non-routable IP addresses, or the address of a server controlled
by the censor [8], [91].
IP-based blocking. Once the browser has an IP address of a
web server, it makes a TCP connection to that server. Censors
can discard TCP handshake packets destined for IP addresses
known to host censored content, reply with a TCP reset packet,
or reroute them to a server controlled by the censor [46].
TCP packet injection. Censors can also allow the TCP
handshake to complete, and then inject a packet into the
TCP stream that either supersedes the first response from the
legitimate server, or breaks the connection before the response
arrives [82]. For unencrypted websites, this technique allows
the censor to observe the first HTTP query sent by the client,
and thus block access to individual pages [24].
Transparent proxy. Censors wishing to exercise finer control
can use a “transparent proxy” that intercepts all HTTP traffic
leaving the country, decodes it, and chooses whether or not
to forward it [26]. Transparent proxies act as TCP peers and
may modify HTTP traffic passing through, which makes them
detectable [83]. They permit fine-grained decisions about how
to block access to content. However, they are specific to
unencrypted HTTP and cannot be used to censor traffic in
any other protocol.
B. On-path and in-path censors
Hardware performing DNS manipulation, IP-based blocking,
or TCP packet injection can be connected to the network in two
different ways. It is not known which option is more commonly
used [44], [80].
On-path equipment observes a copy of all traffic passing
through a network link. It can react by injecting packets into
the link, but cannot modify or discard packets that are already
within the flow. While on-path techniques are relatively cheap
and easy to deploy, detection is also easy, as injected packets
appear alongside legitimate traffic.
In-path equipment operates on the actual traffic passing
through the network link, and can inject, modify, or discard
packets. In-path equipment must operate at the line-rate of a
backbone router, so it is more expensive and its features may
be limited (e.g., payload inspection may not be an option), but
it is harder to detect.
C. Overt and covert censorship
Censorship’s visible effects can be either overt or covert.
In overt censorship, the censor sends the user a “block page”
instead of the material that was censored. In covert censorship,
the censor causes a network error that could have occurred
for other reasons, and thus avoids informing the user that
the material was censored. Censors may choose to be overt
for some material and covert for other material. For instance,
Yemen has been observed to overtly block pornography, which
is illegal there, and to covertly block disfavored, but legal,
political content [43].
Overt censorship can be accomplished with a transparent
HTTP proxy, an injected TCP packet or DNS response that
directs the browser to a server controlled by the censor, or
by rerouting TCP traffic to a server controlled by the censor.
Covert censorship can be accomplished with a transparent
HTTP proxy, an injected TCP reset packet, an injected DNS
error or non-routable address, or by discarding packets.
III. System Architecture
ICLab is a platform for measuring censorship of network
traffic. As shown in Figure 1, it consists of a central control
server and a set of vantage points distributed worldwide. The
central server schedules measurements for each vantage point
to perform, distributes test lists, and collects measurement
results for analysis. The vantage points send and receive
network traffic to perform each measurement, and upload their
observations to the central server. All analysis is done centrally
after the measurements have completed. Raw observations,
including complete packet logs, are archived so that new
analysis techniques can be applied to old data. There are two
types of vantage points: volunteer-operated devices (VODs)
configured by us and installed in locations of interest by
our volunteers,2 and VPN-based clients, which forward traffic
through commercial VPN proxies located in various countries.
A. Design Goals
We designed ICLab to achieve the following properties:
Global, continuous monitoring. The techniques used for
Internet censorship, the topics censored, and the thoroughness
with which censorship is enforced are known to vary both
among [16], [26], [28], [43], [44], [66] and within [1],
[33], [51], [86], [88] countries. Therefore, the system should
operate vantage points in multiple locations within each of
many countries, to produce a comprehensive global view of
censorship. Censorship may ratchet upward over time [29], [39],
may change abruptly in response to political events [25] and
may even cease after governing parties change [43]. Therefore,
the system should perform its measurements continuously over
a period of years, to detect these changes as they happen.
2Most of these are low-cost Raspberry Pi devices.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of ICLab. (1) The central server sends a measurement
schedule along with an associated test list to vantage points. (2) The vantage
points perform measurements. (3) Collected data is uploaded to the central
server. (4) Censorship detection is done centrally.
Reproducible and extensible. The basic techniques for cen-
soring network traffic (described in §II-A) are well-known [80],
[82] but new variations appear regularly [6], [36]. The short
lifetime of “long tail” content means that the current content
of a website may bear no relationship to what it was when it
was originally censored [84]. Therefore, the system needs to be
extensible with new types of measurement, and should record
as much information as possible with each measurement (e.g.,
packet traces and detailed contextual information).
Minimal risk to volunteers. Censorship monitoring involves
accessing material that is forbidden in a particular country,
from that country, and provoking a response from the censor.
The response we expect is one of the MITM attacks described
in §II-A, but legal or extralegal sanctions aimed at the volunteer
operating the vantage point are also possible. The risk may be
especially significant for volunteers already engaged in human
rights reporting or advocacy. Use of commercial VPNs as
vantage points is intended to mitigate these risks. VODs are
only deployed in locations where we believe legal or extralegal
sanctions are unlikely, and we obtain informed consent from
the volunteers who operate them.
B. Vantage Points
Of ICLab’s 281 vantage points, 264 are VPN-based, obtain-
ing access to locations of interest via commercial VPN services.
17 vantage points are VODs. The measurement software is
the same for both types of vantage; the only difference is that
VPN-based vantages route their traffic through a VPN while
performing measurements.
VPN-based vantages. ICLab uses VPN-based vantages when-
ever possible, because of their practical and ethical advantages.
We do not need to recruit volunteers from all over the world,
or manage physical hardware that has been distributed to them,
but we still have unrestricted access to the network, unlike,
for instance, phone or web applications [17], [37]. The VPN
operator guarantees high availability and reasonable bandwidth,
and they often offer multiple locations within a country. For
75% of the countries where we use VPN-based vantages, the
VPNs give us access to at least two ASes within that country
(see Appendix A).
On the ethical side, a commercial VPN operator is a company
that understands the risks of doing business in each country it
operates in. It is unlikely that they would deploy a server in
a country where the company or its employees might suffer
legal or extralegal sanctions for the actions of its users.
A disadvantage of VPNs is that they only supply a lower
bound on the censorship experienced by individuals in each
country, because their servers are hosted in commercial data
centers. There is some evidence that network censorship is less
aggressively performed by data centers’ ISPs than by residential
ISPs [3], [88]. According to the CAIDA AS classification [18],
41% of the networks hosting our VPN-based vantages are
“content” networks, which are the most likely to be subject to
reduced levels of censorship. However, we have visibility into
at least one other type of AS in 83% of the countries we can
observe. In countries where we have both VPNs and VODs,
we have observed identical block pages from both, indicating
that all types of ASes are subject to similar blocking policies
in those countries.
User-hosted VPNs (e.g., Geosurf [42], Hola [47], Lumi-
nati [55]) would offer access to residential ISPs, but ICLab does
not use them, as they have all the ethical concerns associated
with VODs, with less transparency. Also, there are reports of
illicit actions by the operators of these VPNs, such as deploying
their software as a viral payload, and facilitating distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks [58], making it even more
unethical to use these services.
Since commercial VPNs’ advertised server locations cannot
be relied on [85], we validate their locations using round-trip
time measurements (see Appendix B for details), and we only
use the servers whose locations are accurately advertised.
Volunteer-operated device vantages. VODs are more difficult
to keep running, and require a local volunteer comfortable
with the risks associated with operating the device. Since
ICLab does not collect personally identifiable information
about the volunteers, our IRB has determined that this project
is not human subjects research. However, we are guided by
the principles of ethical human subjects research, particularly
the need to balance potential benefits of the research against
risks undertaken by volunteers. Most of our VODs have been
deployed opportunistically through collaborations with NGOs
and organizations interested in measuring Internet censorship
from a policy perspective. For each deployed VOD, we maintain
contact with the volunteer, and monitor the political situation
in the country of deployment. We have deemed some countries
too risky (for now) to recruit volunteers in (e.g., Iran, Syria).
Breadth of coverage. As of this writing, ICLab has VPN-
based vantage points in 55 countries, and volunteer-operated
clients in 13 countries. 6 countries host both types of clients,
so ICLab has vantage points in 62 countries overall. ICLab
seeks to achieve both geographic and political diversity in its
coverage. Table I summarizes our current geographic diversity
by continent, and political diversity by a combination of two
Table I
Country Coverage of ICLab. The number of countries and ASes on each
continent where we have vantage points with validated locations, since 2017.
Oceania includes Australia. VPNs: virtual private network servers. VODs:
volunteer-operated devices. NF, PF, F: of the countries with vantage points,
how many are politically not free, partially free, or free (see Appendix C).
Continent VPNs VODs Countries ASes NF PF F
Asia 64 4 14/32 54 5 7 2
Africa 9 10 9/72 19 1 6 2
N. America 87 1 5/17 81 0 1 4
S. America 9 0 5/20 6 1 3 1
Europe 83 2 27/42 64 1 5 21
Oceania 12 0 2/ 6 11 0 0 2
Total 264 17 62/189 234 8 22 32
scores of political freedom, developed by Freedom House [39]
and Reporters Without Borders [68] (see Appendix C).
It is easier to acquire access to vantage points in Europe,
North America, and East Asia than in many other parts of
the world. We have plans for expanded coverage in Africa and
South America in the near future, via additional VPN services.
It is also easier to acquire access to vantage points in “free” and
“partially free” than “not free” countries, because it is often
too risky for either VPN services or volunteer-operated devices
to operate in “not free” countries. Expanding our coverage
of “not free” countries is a priority for future development of
ICLab, provided we can do it safely.
Internet censorship does happen in the “partly free” and
“free” countries, and is not nearly as well documented as
it is for specific “not free” countries (most notably China).
Our broad coverage of these classes of countries gives us the
ability to track changes over time, across the full spectrum of
censorship policy, worldwide.
C. Test Lists
At present, ICLab’s measurements are focused on network-
level interference with access to websites. ICLab’s vantage
points test connectivity to the websites on three lists: the Alexa
global top 500 websites (ATL) [5], the websites identified as
globally sensitive by the Citizen Lab [22] and the Berkman
Klein Center [11]3 (CLBL-G), and, for each country, the
websites identified as locally sensitive in that country by Citizen
Lab and Berkman Klein (CLBL-C). We only use the global
top 500 sites from Alexa’s ranking, because its “long tail” is
unstable [54], [71]. All test lists are updated weekly.
ICLab has tested a total of 47,000 unique URLs over the
course of its operation. Because all of the vantage points
test ATL and CLBL-G, there is more aggregated data for
these sites: 40% of our data is from sites on ATL, 40% from
sites on CLBL-G, and 20% from sites on CLBL-C. Individual
vantage points test anywhere from 3,000 to 5,700 URLs per
measurement cycle, depending on the size of CLBL-C for the
vantage point’s country. This is by no means the complete set
of sites blocked in any one country [28], and we have plans to
broaden our testing, as described further in Section IX.
3The lists maintained by Citizen Lab and Berkman Klein are formally
independent but have substantial overlap, so we combine them.
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Fig. 2. Measurements since 2017 by country. For each of the 62 countries
where we have, or had, vantage points since 2017, the total number of
measurements per week.
D. Data Collection
A measurement of a URL is an attempt to perform an HTTP
GET request to that URL, recording information about the
results from multiple layers of the network stack: (1) The
complete DNS request and response or responses for the server
hostname (using both a local resolver and a public DNS
resolver). (2) Whether or not a TCP connection succeeded.
(3) For HTTPS URLs, the certificate chain transmitted by the
server. (4) The full HTTP response (both headers and body).
(5) A traceroute to the server. (6) A comprehensive packet trace
for the duration of the measurement. This allows us to identify
anomalies that would not be apparent from application-layer
information alone. For instance, when packets are injected by
on-path censors, we can observe both the injected packets and
the legitimate responses they conflict with (see Section IV-B).
Each vantage point measures connectivity to all of the sites
on its test list at least once every three days, on a schedule
controlled by the central server. Depending on the size of the
test list, a cycle of measurements typically runs for 1–2 hours.
Figure 2 depicts ICLab’s measurements over time in each
country. Operating ICLab over a multi-year period has not
been easy; several outages are visible in Figure 2. For instance,
we lost access to our vantage points in Iran in May 2017 due
to a change in the international sanctions imposed on Iran,
and we suffered a year-long, multi-country outage due to one
VPN provider making configuration changes without notice.
The latter incident led us to improve our internal monitoring
and our tracking of VPN configuration changes.
Between January 2017 and September 2018, ICLab con-
ducted 53,906,532 measurements of 45,565 URLs in 62
countries and 234 ASes. We publish our data for use by other
researchers,4 with periodic updates as we continue operation.
E. Control Nodes
Many tests of censorship rely on comparison of measure-
ments between the vantage point and a “control” location,
where there is not anticipated to be censorship. We repeat
all the measurements performed by our vantage points on a
control node located in an academic network in the USA. This
network allows access to all the sites we test for accessibility.
The control node has also suffered outages. In this paper, we
use public data sets compiled by other researchers to fill in the
gaps, as described in Section IV. We have since deployed three
more control nodes in Europe, Asia and the USA to improve
reliability and geographic diversity.
IV. Censorship Detection
Next, we describe how ICLab detects manipulated DNS
responses (§IV-A), packets injected into TCP streams (§IV-B)
and HTML-based block pages (§IV-C). All of ICLab’s detection
algorithms are designed to minimize both false negatives, in
which a censored site is not detected, and false positives, in
which ordinary site or network outages, or DNS load balancing
are misidentified as censorship [32], [43], [48], [82].
A. DNS Manipulation
To access a website, the browser first resolves its IP address
with a DNS query. To detect DNS manipulation, ICLab records
the DNS responses for each measurement, and compares them
with responses to matching DNS queries from our control node,
and with DNS responses observed by control nodes OONI [37]
operates. ICLab applies the following heuristics, in order, to
the observations from the vantage point and the control nodes.
Vantage point receives two responses with different ASes.
If a vantage point receives two responses to a DNS query, both
with globally routable addresses, but belonging to two different
ASes, we label the measurement as DNS manipulation. This
heuristic detects on-path censors who inject a packet carrying
false addresses [8]. Requiring the ASes to differ avoids false
positives caused by a DNS load balancer picking a different
address from its pool upon retransmission.
Vantage point receives NXDOMAIN or non-routable ad-
dress. If a vantage point receives either a “no such host” re-
sponse to a query (NXDOMAIN, in DNS protocol terms [13]),
or an address that is not globally routable (e.g., 10.x.y.z) [12],
but the control nodes consistently receive a globally routable
address (not necessarily the same one) for the domain name,
over a period of seven days centered on the day of the vantage
point’s observation, we label the test as DNS manipulation.
The requirement for consistency over seven days is to avoid
false positives on sites that have been shut down, during the
period where a stale address may still exist in DNS caches.
Vantage point receives addresses from the same AS as
control nodes. If a vantage point receives a globally routable
4Available online at https://iclab.org/.
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Fig. 3. DNS manipulation false positives. The false positive rate for the
DNS manipulation detector, as a function of the threshold parameter θ.
address, and the control nodes also receive globally routable
addresses assigned to the same AS (not necessarily the
exact same address), we label the measurement as not DNS
manipulation. Variation within a single AS is likely to be due
to load-balancing over a server pool in a single location.
Vantage point and control nodes receive addresses in
different ASes. The most difficult case to classify is when the
vantage point and the control nodes receive globally routable
addresses assigned to different ASes. This can happen when
DNS manipulation is used to redirect traffic to a specific server
(e.g., to display a block page). However, it can also happen
when a content provider or CDN directs traffic to data centers
near the client [66].
We distinguish censors from CDNs using the observation
that censors tend to map many blocked websites onto just a
few addresses [9], [43]. If a set of websites resolve to a single
IP address from the vantage point, but resolve to IPs in more
than θ ASes from the control nodes, we count those websites as
experiencing DNS manipulation. θ is a tunable parameter which
we choose by cross-checking whether these measurements also
observed either a block page or no HTTP response at all.
Taking this cross-check as ground truth, Figure 3 shows how
the false positive rate for DNS manipulation varies with θ. For
the results in Section V, we use a conservative θ = 11 which
gives a false positive rate on the order of 10−4.
B. TCP Packet Injection
Censors may also allow DNS lookup to complete normally,
but then inject packets that disrupt the TCP handshake or
subsequent traffic. ICLab detects this form of censorship by
recording packet traces of all TCP connections during each
test, and analyzing them for (1) evidence of packet injection,
and (2) evidence of intent to censor (e.g., block page content
or TCP reset flags in injected packets). By requiring both types
of evidence, we minimize false positives. Short error messages
delivered by the legitimate server will not appear to be injected,
and packets that, for innocuous reasons, appear to be injected,
will not display an intent to censor.
Evidence of packet injection. If an end host receives two TCP
packets with valid checksums and the same sequence number
but different payloads, the operating system will generally
accept the first packet to arrive, and discard the second [67].
An on-path censor can therefore suppress the server’s HTTP
response by injecting a packet carrying its own HTTP response
(or simply an RST or FIN), timed to arrive first. Because ICLab
records packet traces, it records both packets and detects a
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Fig. 4. Classification of packet anomalies by comparison to control observa-
tions.
conflict. This is not infallible proof of packet injection; it can
also occur for innocuous reasons, such as HTTP load balancers
that do not send exactly the same packet when they retransmit.
Intent to censor: RST, FIN, or block page. When we detect
a pair of conflicting packets, we inspect them for evidence
of intent to censor. An injected packet can disrupt/censor
communication by carrying a TCP reset (RST) or close (FIN)
flag, causing the client to abort the connection and report a
generic error [24], [82]; or it can carry an HTTP response
declaring the site to be censored (a “block page,” discussed
further in Section IV-C), which will be rendered instead of the
true contents of the page the client requested [26], [48].
As with DNS manipulation, we compare each observation
from a vantage point that shows evidence of packet injection,
with matching observations from a control node. We apply the
following heuristics, in order, to pairs of observations. The
various outcomes of these heuristics are shown in Figure 4.
No matching control observation. When a TCP stream from
the vantage point shows evidence of packet injection, but does
not seem to correspond to any observation taken by the control
node, we abandon any attempt to classify it. This is the “No
record for URL” row of Figure 4.
This filtering is necessary because of a limitation in our
packet trace analyzer. When a website transfers all of its traffic
to another domain name, either via a CNAME record in DNS
or using HTTP redirects, the trace analyzer cannot tell that TCP
connections to the second domain name are associated with an
attempt to test the first domain name. We conservatively do
not consider these cases as censorship.
Packet collision after handshake, with RST or FIN. When a
TCP stream from the vantage point shows evidence of collisions
in TCP sequence numbers after successful completion of the
three-way handshake, one side of the collision has its RST
or FIN bit set and the other side has neither bit set, we label
the measurement as censored by packet injection, regardless
of what the control node observed. This is the “connection
disrupted” column of Figure 4. We have high confidence that
all of these are true positives.
Packet collision after handshake, with payload conflict.
When a TCP stream from the vantage point shows evidence of
TCP sequence number collisions after successful completion of
the three-way handshake, but neither side of the collision has
the RST or FIN bit set, we inspect the contents of the packets
for a block page signature, as described in §IV-C. We label the
measurement as censored by packet injection only if a known
block page signature appears in one of the packets. These cases
are the “payload collision (blockpage)” and “payload collision
(no blockpage)” columns of Figure 4. Again, we have high
confidence that these are true positives and negatives.
Matching RST or ICMP unreachable instead of SYN-ACK.
When a TCP SYN from the vantage point receives either
a TCP RST or an ICMP unreachable packet, instead of a
SYN-ACK, and the control node observes the same network
error, we conclude the site is down for everyone, and label the
measurement as not censored. These cases are the matching
“connection refused” and “host unreachable” cells on the left-
hand side of Figure 4, and we have high confidence that they
are true negatives.
RST or ICMP unreachable instead of SYN-ACK, at
vantage only. When a TCP SYN from the vantage point
receives either a TCP RST or an ICMP unreachable packet in
response, instead of a SYN-ACK, but the control node is able to
carry out a successful HTTP dialogue, this probably indicates
IP-based censorship observed by the vantage point. However,
there are other possible explanations, such as a local network
outage at the vantage point, or a site blocking access from
specific IP addresses on suspicion of malice [57]. Manual spot-
checking suggests that many, but not all, of these observations
are censorship. These cases are labeled as “probable censorship”
in Figure 4, and we discuss them separately in Section V.
Mismatched network errors, or timeout or DNS error at
control node. When the vantage point and the control node
both received a network error in response to their initial SYN,
but not the same network error; when the control node’s initial
SYN received no response at all; and when the control node
was unable to send a SYN in the first place because of a
DNS error; we cannot say whether the measurement indicates
censorship. These cases are the cells labeled “uncertain” in the
lower left-hand corner of Figure 4. We are conservative and
do not consider these as censorship in our analysis.
C. Block Page Detection and Discovery
Block page contents vary depending on the country and the
technology used for censorship. Known block pages can be
detected with regular expressions applied to the TCP payloads
of suspicious packets, but these will miss small variations from
the expected text, and are no help at all with unknown block
pages.
Nonetheless, ICLab uses a set of 308 regular expressions to
detect known block pages. We manually verified these match
specific, known block pages and nothing else. 40 of them were
developed by the Citizen Lab [21], 24 by OONI [37], 144 by
Quack [79], and 100 by us.
Anomalous packets that do not match any of these regular
expressions are examined for block page variations and un-
known block pages, as described below; when we discover
a block page that was missed by the regular expressions, we
write new ones to cover them.
Self-contained HTTP response. To deliver a block page, the
protocol structure of HTTP requires a censor to inject a single
packet containing a complete, self-contained HTTP response.
This packet must conflict with the first data packet of the
legitimate response. Therefore, only packets which are both
involved in a TCP sequence number conflict, and contain a
complete HTTP response, are taken as candidate block pages
for the clustering processes described next.
HTML structure clusters. The HTML tag structure of a block
page is characteristic of the filtering hardware and software
used by the censor. When the same equipment is used in many
different locations, the tag structure is often an exact match,
even when the text varies. We reduce each candidate block page
to a vector of HTML tag frequencies (1 <body>, 2 <p>, 3 <em>,
etc.) and compare the vectors to all other candidate block pages’
vectors, and to vectors for pages that match the known block
page regular expressions. When we find an exact match, we
manually inspect the matching candidates and decide whether
to add a new regular expression to the detection set. Using
this technique we discovered 15 new block page signatures in
five countries.
Textual similarity clusters. Within one country, the legal
jargon used to justify censoring may vary, but is likely to
be similar overall. For example, one Indian ISP refers to “a
court of competent jurisdiction” in its block pages, and another
uses the phrase “Hon’ble Court” instead. Small variations like
this are evidently the same page to a human, but a regular
expression will miss them. We apply locality-sensitive hashing
(LSH) [90] to the text of the candidate block pages, after
canonicalizing the HTML structure. LSH produces clusters of
candidate pages, centered on pages that do match the known
block page regular expressions. As with the tag frequency
vectors, we manually inspect the clusters and decide whether
to add new regular expressions to the curated set. Using this
technique, we discovered 33 new block page signatures in eight
countries. An example cluster is shown in Appendix D.
URL-to-country ratio. To discover wholly unknown block
pages we take each LSH cluster that is not centered on a known
block page, count the number of URLs that produced a page
in that cluster, and divide by the number of countries where
a page in that cluster was observed. This is essentially the
same logic as counting the number of websites that resolve to
a single IP from a test vantage point but not a control vantage
point, but we do not use a threshold. Instead, we sort the
clusters from largest to smallest URL-to-country ratio and then
inspect the entire list manually. The largest ratio associated
with a newly discovered block page was 286 and the smallest
ratio was 1.0.
V. Findings
Between January 2017 and September 2018, ICLab con-
ducted 53,906,532 measurements of 45,565 URLs in 62
countries. Because we do not have continuous coverage of all
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Fig. 5. Comparison of DNS responses for the same domain between local
and public nameservers from the same vantage point.
these countries (see §III-D), in this paper we present findings
only for countries where we successfully collected at least three
months’ worth of data prior to September 2018. Among those
countries, five stand out as conducting the most censorship
overall: Iran, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, India, and Kenya.
When considering specific subsets of our data, sometimes
Turkey or Russia displaces one of these five.
A. Specific Results
We first present details of our observations for each of the
three censorship techniques that we can detect.
DNS manipulation. We observe 15,007 DNS manipulations
in 56 countries, applied to 489 unique URLs. 98% of these
cases received NXDOMAIN or non-routable addresses.
Figure 5 compares DNS responses from a vantage point’s
local recursive resolver with those received by the same vantage
point from a public DNS utility (e.g., 8.8.8.8). The upper
left-hand cell of this chart counts cases where there is no
DNS censorship; the other cells in the left-hand column count
cases where censorship is being performed by the local DNS
recursive resolver. The top rightmost cell counts the number of
observations where censorship is being performed only by a
public DNS utility, and the bottom rightmost cell counts cases
where censorship is being performed by both a local recursive
resolver and a public DNS utility. We observe censorship by
public DNS utilities only for a few sites from Russia, Bulgaria,
and Iran. The middle three columns could be explained as
either censorship or as unrelated DNS failures.
Packet injection. We observe 19,493,925 TCP packet injec-
tions across 55 countries, applied to 11,482 unique URLs.
However, after applying the filtering heuristics described in
§IV-B, only 0.7% of these are definitely due to censorship:
143,225 injections, in 54 countries, applied to 1,205 unique
URLs. (The numbers in Figure 4 are higher because they do
not account for all the filtering heuristics.) Packet injections
are usually used to disrupt a connection without delivering
a block page; block pages are delivered by only 3.4% of the
injections we attribute to censorship.
Another 15,589,882 packet injections—58% of the total—
are network errors received instead of a SYN-ACK packet.
These are described as “probable censorship” in Figure 4. They
could indicate an in-path censor blocking hosts by IP address,
but there are many other possible explanations. Our synthetic
results (below) might be quite different if we were able to
classify these more accurately.
Block pages. We observe 232,183 block pages across 50
countries, applied to 2,782 unique URLs. Iran presents block
pages for 24.9% of the URLs it censors, more than any other
country. In all of the countries we monitor, block pages are
most likely to be used for URLs in the pornography and news
categories (see below).
B. Synthetic Analysis
Combining observations of all three types of censorship
gives us a clearer picture of what is censored in the countries
we monitor, and complements missing events in each.
We use the “FortiGuard” URL classification service, operated
by FortiNet [38], to categorize the contents of each test list.
This service is sold as part of a “web filter” for corporations,
which is the same software as a nation-state censorship system,
but on a smaller scale. The URLs on all our lists, together, fall
into 79 high-level categories according to this service; the 25
most common of these, for URLs that are censored at least
once, are listed in Table IV, along with the abbreviated names
used in other tables in this section.
Table II shows the three most censored categories of URLs
for the five countries conducting the most censorship, based on
the percentage of unique URLs censored over time. It is divided
into four columns, showing how the results vary depending
on which of our test lists are considered: all of them, only
ATL, only CLBL-G, or only CLBL-C. Table VI in Appendix D
continues this table with information about the countries ranked
6 through 15.
Iran takes first place in all four columns, and Saudi Arabia
is always within the top three. The other countries appearing in
Table II are within the top five only for some test lists. The top
three categories blocked by each country change somewhat from
list to list. For instance, pornography is much less prominent
on the country-specific lists than on the global list. Iran’s
censorship is more uniformly distributed over topics than the
other countries, where censorship is concentrated on one or
two categories. These results demonstrate how the choice of
test lists can change observations about censorship policy.
Table III shows the top five countries conducting the most
censorship, for each of the three censorship techniques that
ICLab can detect, with the top three categories censored with
that technique. This shows how censors use different techniques
to censor different types of content, as we mentioned in §I. For
example, Turkey uses DNS manipulation for categories ILL
and STRM, but uses block pages for PORN and NEWS.
Figure 6 shows how often the various blocking techniques
are combined. For instance, in Iran we detect some URLs being
redirected to a block page via DNS manipulation (comparing
with Table III, we see that these are the URLs in the PORN
and BLOG categories), but for many others, we detect only
the block page. This could be because Iran uses a technique
we cannot detect for those URLs (e.g., route manipulation),
or because our analysis of packet injection is too conservative
(see Section IV-B).
Table II
Censorship by Test List and Category. For each of the three test lists we use (see §III-C), the five countries censoring the most URLs from that list, the top
three FortiGuard categories for their censored URLs (abbreviations defined in Table IV), and the percentage of URLs from that list that are censored.
Overall Alexa Global (ATL) Globally Sensitive (CLBL-G) Per-Country Sensitive (CLBL-C)
Country Category Pct. Country Category Pct. Country Category Pct. Country Category Pct.
Iran NEWS 13.1% Iran NEWS 14.0% Iran PORN 11.6% Iran NEWS 21.0%
PORN 9.2% PORN 12.7% NEWS 9.4% BLOG 17.6%
BLOG 7.5% ENT 10.3% PROX 6.8% POL 7.2%
South Korea PORN 15.4% South Korea SHOP 14.2% Saudi Arabia PORN 31.0% India ENT 19.0%
NEWS 8.4% PORN 13.7% GAMB 13.5% STRM 14.3%
ORG 7.4% NEWS 10.8% PROX 12.2% NEWS 10.8%
Saudi Arabia PORN 29.5% Saudi Arabia PORN 70.0% South Korea PORN 15.6% Saudi Arabia NEWS 54.0%
NEWS 11.3% ILL 6.6% ORG 10.4% POL 7.7%
GAMB 10.1% GAMB 6.6% NEWS 5.7% RELI 7.7%
India ENT 13.3% Turkey PORN 66.0% Kenya PORN 14.5% Russia BLOG 16.5%
STRM 10.8% ILL 4.0% GAMB 10.8% NEWS 14.4%
NEWS 10.4% FILE 4.0% PROX 9.0% GAMB 12.4%
Kenya PORN 15.5% India ILL 35.5% Turkey PORN 47.0% Turkey NEWS 29.4%
GAMB 10.1% IT 8.8% GAMB 22.6% PORN 13.7%
PROX 8.3% STRM 6.6% ILL 3.2% GAMB 9.8%
Table III
Censorship Variation by Technique. For each of the three techniques we
can detect, the five countries observed to censor the most URLs using that
technique, and the top three FortiGuard categories for those URLs
(abbreviations defined in Table IV). Percentages are of all unique URLs tested.
Technique Country Categories Pct.
Block page Iran NEWS, PORN, BLOG 24.95%
Saudi Arabia PORN, NEWS, GAMB 11.1%
India ENT, STRM, NEWS 6.4%
Kenya PORN, GAMB, PROX 4.8%
Turkey PORN, GAMB, NEWS 4.6%
DNS Iran BLOG, PORN, PROX 5.5%
manipulation Uganda PORN, ADUL, LING 1.7%
Turkey ILL, GAMB, STRM 0.3%
Bulgaria ILL, ARM, DOM 0.2%
Netherlands ILL, IM, DOM 0.2%
TCP packet South Korea PORN, ORG, NEWS 9.3%
injection India NEWS, ILL, IT 2.3%
Netherlands NEWS, SEAR, GAME 0.9%
Japan NEWS, GAME, SEAR 0.9%
Australia SEAR, NEWS, ILL 0.8%
0%
10%
20%
U
ni
qu
e 
U
R
Ls
 te
st
ed
 Iran
 South Korea
 Saudi Arabia
 India
 Kenya
TO
TA
L
Block page
TCP packet injection
DNS manipulation
Fig. 6. Combinations of Censorship Techniques. For the five countries
performing the most censorship overall, which combinations of the three
phenomena ICLab can detect are observed. Except for “TOTAL,” each group
of bars is mutually exclusive—URLs counted under “DNS manipulation and
packet injection” are not also counted under either “DNS manipulation” or
“packet injection.”
Table IV
FortiGuard Categories and Abbreviations. The 25 most common
categories for the URLs on our test lists that were censored at least once,
with the abbreviated names used in Tables II and III, and the percentage of
URLs in each category. CLBL includes both global and per-country test lists.
Abbrev. Category ATL % CLBL %
ADUL Other Adult Materials 0.91 0.77
ARM Armed Forces 0.76 0.31
BLOG Personal websites and blogs 2.00 8.97
DOM Domain Parking 0.21 0.28
ENT Entertainment 2.66 2.25
FILE File Sharing and Storage 1.89 0.55
GAME Games 2.62 0.83
GAMB Gambling 1.73 1.18
HEAL Health and Wellness 2.02 1.04
ILL Illegal or Unethical 1.85 0.40
IM Instant Messaging 0.49 0.14
IT Information Technology 9.31 4.17
ITRA Internet radio and TV 0.39 0.59
LING Lingerie and Swimsuit 0.76 0.14
NEWS News and Media 10.03 18.87
ORG General Organizations 6.82 4.77
POL Political Organizations 1.56 5.28
PORN Pornography 3.87 2.45
PROX Proxy Avoidance 1.71 0.57
RELI Global Religion 3.19 2.58
SEAR Search Engines and Portals 3.93 2.36
SHOP Shopping 4.86 1.40
SOC Social Networking 1.19 1.34
SOLI Society and Lifestyles 0.76 0.97
STRM Streaming Media and Download 1.83 1.42
C. Longitudinal Analysis
Collecting data for nearly two years gives us the ability
to observe changes in censorship over time. Figure 7 shows
censorship trends for the six countries ICLab can monitor
that block the most URLs from the global test lists (ATL and
CLBL-G), plus a global trend line computed from aggregate
measurements from all the other monitored countries. We do
not have complete coverage for Iran and Saudi Arabia, due to
the outages mentioned in §III-D. The large dip in several of
the trend lines in February 2017 is an artifact due to month-
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Fig. 7. Logarithmic Plot of Longitudinal Trends. Changes over time in
the level of censorship, within the six countries where we observe the most
censorship of URLs from ATL and CLBL-G, plus the aggregate of all other
monitored countries.
to-month churn within the Alexa rankings (see Scheitle et al.
[71]).
The global trend line shows a steady decreasing trend, which
we attribute to the rising use of secure channel protocols
(e.g., TLS) and circumvention tools. This trend is also visible
for South Korea but not for the other top five countries.
Iran blocks 20–30% of the URLs from ATL, more than any
other country. This is due to extensive blocking of URLs in
the NEWS and BLOG categories. Saudi Arabia consistently
blocks roughly 10% of ATL and CLBL-G URLs, mostly
from the PORN and GAMB categories with some NEWS
as well. South Korea applies a similar level of blocking for the
PORN and GAMB categories; it is a much more democratic
nation than Saudia Arabia, but it nonetheless has applied
draconian restrictions to “indecent Internet sites” (including
both pornography and gambling sites) since before 2008 [63].
Censorship in Kenya is stable at a rate of roughly 0.4%
except for March 2017, where the rate spikes to 10%. This
is an artifact; for that one month, our VOD in Kenya was
connected to a network that applied much more aggressive
“filtering” to porn, gambling, and proxy sites than is typical for
Kenya, using a commercial product.
At the beginning of 2018, we observe a drop in the level of
filtering in India, from 2% to 0.8%, followed by a slow rise
back to about 1.5% after about four months. This coincides
with political events: India’s telecommunications regulator
announced support for “net neutrality” at the end of 2017 [70],
[89], and most ISPs suspended their filtering in response.
However, when a detailed regulation on net neutrality was
published in mid-2018 [75], it became clear that the government
had not intended to relax its policy regarding content deemed
to be illegal, and the filtering was partially reinstated.
Similarly, we see a rise in the level of filtering in Turkey in
June 2017, from an earlier level of 3% to 5%. Although it is
not visible on this chart, the topics censored also change at
this time. Prior to the rise, most of the blocked sites in Turkey
carried pornography and other sexual content; after the rise,
many more news sites were blocked. This, too, coincides with
political events. Following a controversial referendum which
increased the power of the Turkish Presidency, the government
has attempted to suppress both internal political opposition
and news published from other countries. International news
organizations took notice of the increased level of Turkish
online censorship in May of 2017 [40], [74], while ICLab
detected it around the end of April.
D. Heuristic False Positives
We manually reviewed the results of all of our heuristic
detectors for errors. Manual review cannot detect false negatives,
because we have no way of knowing that we should have
detected a site as censored, but false positives are usually
obvious. Here we discuss the most significant cases we found,
and how we adjusted the heuristics to compensate.
DNSManipulation. We manually verified the detection results
identified by each heuristic. The only heuristic producing false
positives was the rule for when a vantage point and control
nodes receive addresses in different ASes. As we mentioned
in Section IV-A, this heuristic gives a false positive rate on
the order of 10−4 with the value of θ we selected.
Packet injection. As with DNS manipulation, we manually
reviewed the results of each heuristic for false positives. We
found many false positives for RST or ICMP unreachable
instead of SYN-ACK, leading us to reclassify these as only
“probable” censorship and not include them in the synthetic
analysis above. We also found cases in all of the categories
where a packet anomaly was only observed once, for a
URL that seemed unlikely to be censored from that vantage
(e.g., connection disrupted to an airline website from a VPN
vantage in the USA). We therefore discount all cases where a
packet anomaly has only been observed once for that URL in
that country.
Block pages. Our set of regular expressions did initially
produce some false positives, for instance on news reportage
of censorship, quoting the text of a block page. We manually
reviewed all of the matches and adjusted the regular expressions
until no false positives remained. It was always possible to do
this without losing any true positives.
VI. Other Cases of Network Interference
In this section, we describe three cases of network inter-
ference discovered with ICLab, that are different from the
form of censorship we set out to detect: Geoblocking by
content providers (§VI-A), injection of a script to fingerprint
clients (§VI-B), and injected malware (§VI-C).
A. Geoblocking and HTTP 451
HTTP status code 451, “Unavailable for Legal Reasons,”
was defined in 2016 for web servers to use when they cannot
provide content due to a legal obstacle (e.g., the Google restricts
access to clients from Iran to enforce US sanctions [57]) or
requests from foreign governments [14].
We observe 23 unique websites that return status 451, from
vantages in 21 countries. Six of these cases appear to be
wordpress.com complying with requests from Turkey and Russia
(for blogs related to political and religious advocacy). Along
with the HTTP 451 status, they also serve a block page,
explaining that wordpress.com is complying with local laws
and court orders. Two more websites (both pornographic) were
observed to return status 451 from Russia, with HTTP server
headers indicating the error originates from the Cloudflare
CDN, but without any explanation. Since the adoption of the
GDPR [41] we have observed a few sites returning status 451
when visited from European countries.
Since status 451 is relatively new, the older, more generic
status 403 (“Forbidden”) is also used to indicate geoblocking for
legal reasons. Applying the tag frequency clustering technique
described in Section IV-C to the accompanying HTML, we
were able to discover six more URLs, in four countries, where
status 403 is used with a block page stating that access is
prohibited from the client’s location. Three of these were
gambling sites, with the text of the block page stating that
the sites are complying with local regulations.
We also observe a related phenomenon at the DNS level.
From a single VPN server located in the USA, we ob-
served netflix.com resolving to an IANA-reserved IP address,
198.18.0.3. This could be Netflix refusing to provide their
service to users behind a VPN.
B. User Tracking Injection
Our detector for block pages (§IV-C) flagged a cluster of
TCP payloads observed only in South Korea. Upon manual
inspection, these pages contained a script that would fingerprint
the client and then load the originally intended page. We
observed injections of this script over a five-month period from
Oct. 2016 through Feb. 2017, from vantage points within three
major Korean ISPs, into 5–30% of all our test page loads,
with no correlation with the content of the affected page. By
contrast, censorship in South Korea affects less than 1% of our
tests and is focused on pornography, illegal file sharing, and
North Korean propaganda.
These scripts could be injected by the VPN service, the ISPs,
or one or more of their transit providers. The phenomenon
resembles techniques used by ad networks for recording profiles
of individual web users [2]. This demonstrates the importance
of manual checking for false positives in censorship detection.
All of the detection heuristics described in Sections IV-B
and IV-C triggered on these scripts, but they are not censorship.
C. Cryptocurrency Mining Injection
Our block page detector also flagged a set of suspicious
responses observed only in Brazil. The originally intended
page would load, but it would contain malware causing the
web browser to mine cryptocurrency. (As of mid-2018, this is a
popular way to earn money with malware [53].) We were able
to identify the malware as originating with a botnet infecting
MikroTik routers (exploiting CVE-2018-14847), initially seen
only in Brazil [49] but now reported to affect more than
200,000 routers worldwide [31]. Infected routers inject the
mining malware into HTTP responses passing through them.
The malware appears in ICLab’s records as early as July 21st,
2018—ten days before the earliest public report on the MikroTik
botnet that we know of. If ICLab’s continuous monitoring
were coupled with continuous analysis and alerting (which is
planned) it could also have detected this botnet prior to the
public report. This highlights the importance of continuously
monitoring network interference in general.
VII. Comparison with other Platforms
Other censorship measurement platforms active, at the
time of writing, include Encore [17], Satellite-Iris [66], [72],
Quack [79], and OONI [37]. Table V shows the high-level
features provided by each of these platforms, and a comparison
of their country, AS, and URL coverage for the two-month
period of August and September 2018. (August 1, 2018 is
the earliest date for which data from Quack and Satellite-Iris
has been published.) All platforms suffer some variation from
day to day in coverage, so we report both a weekly average
and the maximum number of covered countries, ASes, and
URLs. While many of the platforms described in Table V have
chosen to emphasize breadth of country and AS coverage at the
expense of detail. ICLab takes the opposite approach, collecting
detailed information from a smaller number of vantage points.
A. Quack
Quack relies on public echo servers to measure censorship.
It requires at least 15 echo servers within the same country
for robust measurements [79]. Currently, these are available to
Quack from 75 countries. 95 more countries have at least one
echo server, which can still provide some measurements.
Quack aims to detect censorship of websites, but it does not
send or receive well-formed HTTP messages. Instead it sends
packets that mimic HTTP requests, which the echo server will
reflect back to the client. It expects the censor to react to this
reflection in the same way that it would to a real HTTP message.
The designers of Quack acknowledge the possibility of false
negatives when the censor only looks for HTTP traffic on the
usual ports (80 and 443). More seriously, manual inspection
of the Quack data set reveals that in 32.6% of the tests marked
as blocked, the client did not successfully transmit a mimic
request in the first place. We have reported this apparent bug
to the Quack team.
B. Satellite-Iris
Satellite-Iris [19] combines Satellite [72] and Iris [66]. It
focuses on DNS manipulation, measuring from open DNS
resolvers. It compares the responses received from these vantage
points with responses observed from a control node. It also
retrieves corresponding TLS certificates from the Censys [30]
data set and checks whether they are valid. It applies several
heuristics to each response, all of which must be satisfied for
the response to be judged as censorship. We now highlight two
cases where their heuristics lead to false negatives.
If Satellite-Iris can retrieve a TLS certificate from any of the
IP addresses in the open resolver’s response, and that certificate
is valid for any domain name, it considers the response not
to be censored. This means Satellite-Iris will not detect any
case where the censor supplies the address of a server for a
Table V
High-level comparison of ICLab with five other censorship monitoring platforms.
Platform Packet Vantage Point Types Detection Capabilities Coverage (avg/max)
Capture VPNs ORsa VODs DNS TCP Blockpage Countries ASes URLs
Encore [17] ✓ Unknownb Unknown 23
Satellite-Iris [66], [72] ✓ ✓ 174 / 179 3,261 / 3,617 2,094 / 2,423
Quack [79] ✓ 75 / 76 3,528 / 4,135 2,157 / 2,484
OONI [37] ◯c ✓ ✓ ✓ 113 / 156 670 / 2,015 13,582 / 20,258
ICLab ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 42 / 50 48 / 62 16.964 / 23,992
aOpen Relays: Internet hosts that will relay a censorship probe from researchers’ computers without any prior arrangement.
bDue to privacy concerns, Encore does not record this information.
cThe OONI client can optionally collect packet traces. However, OONI’s servers do not record traces, due to privacy concerns.
Cumulative % of all observations
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2,700,000
1,000,000
750,000
340,000
320,000
270,000
250,000
180,000
150,000
130,000
120,000
700,000
United States
Ireland
Germany
France
Canada
Italy
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Austria
Australia
Switzerland
40 other countries
270,000
260,000
180,000
180,000
150,000
140,000
110,000
520,000
Malaysia
India
South Korea
Brazil
Greece
Uganda
Mexico
62 other countries
4,200,000
180,000
170,000
110,000
210,000
Russia
Venezuela
Pakistan
Iran
22 other countries
510,000Unknown location
Fr
ee
Pa
rtl
y 
Fr
ee
N
ot
 F
re
e
Fig. 8. Distribution of OONI observations by country in August and September
of 2018, grouped by Freedom House classification.
different domain in forged DNS responses. In Satellite-Iris’s
published data set, 0.01% of the measurements are affected
by this. Specifically, measurements from China and Turkey
show domains belonging to the BBC, Google, Tor and others
resolving to an IP address belonging to Facebook’s server pool.
Despite the design bias toward false negatives, we also find
that 83.8% of the DNS responses considered censored by
Satellite-Iris may be false positives. Satellite-Iris depends on
the Censys data set to distinguish DNS poisoning from normal
IP variation (e.g., due to geotargeting and load balancing by
CDNs). When Censys information is unavailable, it falls back
on a comparison to a single control resolver, which is inadequate
to rule out normal variation, as discussed in §IV-A.
C. OONI
OONI [37] relies on volunteers who run a testing application
manually. The application is available on all major desktop
and mobile operating systems except Windows. In August and
September of 2018, OONI’s volunteers conducted 14,000,000
measurements from 156 countries, and reported 29,982 unique
URL-country pairs as blocked.
OONI’s reliance on volunteers, and on manual operation of
the testing application, means that its coverage is not evenly
distributed over websites or countries. Their “primary web
connectivity” test suite also tests ATL and CLBL-G, but the
mobile phone version of the application only tests a short
subsample on each run, in order to limit the time and bandwidth
consumed by the test. 62% of the measurements for the August
and September 2018 period tested fewer than 80 URLs. Figure 8
shows the distribution of countries covered by OONI. 86% of
all observations originate from the 23 countries named in this
figure, and 48% are from just two countries—Russia and the
USA. For another 4% of the observations, no location could be
identified. Comparing Figure 8 to Figure 2 shows that OONI
does not achieve better coverage of “partly free” and “not free”
countries than ICLab does. Volunteers whose Internet access
is unreliable or misconfigured may submit inaccurate results.
Indeed, more than 100,000 of the observations are tagged
inconclusive due to local network errors (e.g., disconnection
during the test).
Because OONI’s testing application runs without any special
privileges, it normally cannot record packet traces. OONI’s
detection heuristics are rudimentary, leading to a high level
of false positives. OONI’s DNS consistency test will flag any
disagreement between the client’s local recursive resolver and
a public DNS utility as censorship [62]. OONI’s block page
detector relies on the “30% shorter than uncensored page”
heuristic proposed by Jones et al. [48], but innocuous server
errors are also short compared to normal page.
Yadav et al. [89] reported very high levels of inaccuracy in
OONI’s results for India, with an 80% false positive rate and
a 11.6% false negative rate. We confirm a high false positive
rate for OONI’s block page detector: of the 12,506 unique
anomalous HTTP responses reported by OONI’s volunteers
in August and September 2018, our block-page detector only
classifies 3,201 of them as censorship, for a 74.4% false positive
rate. The most common cause of false positives is a response
with an empty HTML body, which can occur for a wide variety
of innocuous reasons as well as censorship [4], [57], [77].
VIII. Related Work
China’s censorship practices have been studied in detail [23],
[35], [64], [86], [88] due to the worldwide reputation of the
“Great Firewall” and the relative ease of gaining access to van-
tage points within the country. Other countries receiving case
studies include Iran [6], [10], India [89], Pakistan [51], [60],
Syria [20], and Egypt and Libya [25]. Whenever researchers
have had access to more than one vantage point within a country,
they have found that the policy is not consistently enforced.
There is always region-to-region and ISP-to-ISP variation.
Broader studies divide into two lines of research. One
group of studies investigate worldwide variation in censorship:
for instance, whether censorship mainly interferes with DNS
lookups [66] or subsequent TCP connections, and whether the
end-user is informed of censorship [44], [80]. In some cases, it
has been possible to identify the specific software in use [26],
[48]. Another line of work aims to understand what is censored
and why [1], [16], [84], how that changes over time [7], [43],
how people react to censorship [52], [87], and how the censor
might react to being monitored [16].
We described the difficulties with relying on volunteers in §I
and §III. Several groups of researchers have sought alternatives.
CensMon [73] used Planet Lab nodes, Anderson et al. [7] used
RIPE Atlas nodes, Pearce et al. [66] use open DNS resolvers
and VanderSloot et al. [79] use open echo servers. Darer et al.
[28] took advantage of the fact that the Chinese Great Firewall
will inject forged replies to hosts located outside the country.
Burnett and Feamster [17], Ensafi et al. [33], and Pearce et al.
[65] all propose variations on the theme of using existing hosts
as reflectors for censorship probes, without the knowledge of
their operators, at different levels of the protocol stack.
Only a few studies have lasted more than a month. Five
prominent exceptions are Encore [17], IRIS [66], OONI
[37], Quack[79], and Satellite [72], all of which share goals
similar to ICLab. Section VII provides a detailed comparison
between ICLab and these projects. Herdict [45] has also
been active for years, but simply aggregates user reports of
inaccessible websites. It does not test or report why the sites
are inaccessible.
IX. Limitations
In this section, we discuss ICLab’s limitations and how we
have addressed them.
Discrimination against VPN users. Some websites may block
access from VPN users [57], [72]. We sometimes observe
this discrimination against our VPN clients (see §VI-A for an
example), and are careful not to confuse it for censorship.
Malicious VPN Providers. Some VPN providers engage in
surveillance and traffic manipulation, for instance to monetize
their service by injecting advertisements into users’ traffic [50].
We avoid using VPN providers that are known to do this. Our
block page detectors are designed not to confuse dynamic
content (e.g., advertisements, localization) with censorship,
as described in §IV-C. In §VI-B and VI-C we describe
surveillance and malware injections that required manual
inspection to distinguish from censorship.
VPN providers are also known to falsely advertise the
location of their VPN servers [85]. We verify all server
locations using the technique described in Appendix B.
Bias in Test Lists. ATL suffers from sampling bias and
churn [71]. CLBL-G and CLBL-C may suffer from selection
bias, since they are manually curated by activists. We have
plans to revise the test lists and add more URLs as needed.
CLBL-G and CLBL-C are updated slowly. It is not unusual
for more than half of the sites on a country-specific list to
no longer exist [84]. This is not as much of a limitation as
it might seem, because censors also update their lists slowly.
Several previous studies found that long-gone websites may
still be blocked [1], [60], [89].
Coverage of “Not Free” Countries. As discussed in Sec-
tion §III-B, the risks involved with setting up many vantage
points in certain sensitive (“not free”) countries prevent us
from claiming we can obtain complete coverage at all times.
However, the set of countries ICLab covers gives us a good, if
imperfect, longitudinal overview of worldwide censorship.
Evading Censorship Detection. Censors are known to try to
conceal some of their actions (“covert” censorship). ICLab can
detect some covert censorship, as discussed in §IV, but not all
of it. The “uncertain” and “probably censored” cases of TCP
packet injection (Figure 4 in §IV-B) are priorities for further
investigation. Censors could further conceal their actions by
disabling filtering for IP addresses that appear to be testing for
censorship. Comparing results for vantage points in the same
country gives us no reason to believe any country does this
today.
X. Conclusions
We presented ICLab, a global censorship measurement
platform that is able to measure a wide range of network
interference and Internet censorship techniques.
By using VPN-based vantage points, ICLab provides flex-
ibility and control over measurements, while reducing risks
in measuring Internet censorship at a global scale. Between
January 2017 and September 2018, ICLab has conducted
53,906,532 measurements over 45,565 URLs in 62 countries.
ICLab is able to detect a variety of censorship mechanisms as
well as other forms of network interference. Other longitudinal
measurement platforms may have more vantage points and
accumulated data than ICLab, but also more errors, and/or they
only focus on a specific type of censorship. Our platform
can more reliably distinguish normal network errors from
covert censorship, and our clustering techniques discovered 48
previously unknown block pages.
As we continue to operate ICLab and interact with relevant
political science and civil society organizations, ICLab will not
only make new technical observations, but also place qualitative
work in this area on a firm empirical footing.
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Appendix A
Access to Different ASes within countries of interest
Censorship policies are known to vary from region to region
and network to network within a single country [1], [33],
[51], [86], [88]. Therefore, comprehensive monitoring requires
vantage points located in diverse locations within a country.
Some VPN services offer servers in several physical locations
within a single country, making this simple. Even when they
don’t advertise several physical locations, we have found that
they often load-balance connections to a single hostname over
IP addresses in several different ASes and sometimes different
physical locations as well. When possible, we increase diversity
further by subscribing to multiple VPN services. Figure 9
shows a CDF of the number of networks we can access in each
country, combining all the above factors; we are able to access
two or more networks in 75% of all countries, and three or
more networks in 50%.
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Fig. 9. CDF of number of accessible AS(es) per country
Appendix B
VPN Proxy Location Validation
Commercial VPN services cannot be relied on to locate all
of their servers in the countries where they are advertised to
be [85]. ICLab therefore checks the location of each VPN server
before using it for measurements. We assume that packets are
not able to travel faster than 153 km/ms (0.5104 c) over long
distances. We measure the round-trip time from each VPN
server to a set of landmark hosts in known locations, drawn
from the RIPE Atlas measurement constellation [69]. If any
packet would have had to travel faster than 153 km/ms to reach
the advertised country and return in the measured time, we
assume the server is not in its advertised location, and we do
not use it as a vantage point.
The VPN services we subscribe to collectively advertise
endpoints in 216 countries. Our checker is only able to confirm
the advertised location for 55 countries (25.5% of the total).
Compared to the results reported by Weinberg et al. [85], who
tackled the same problem with more sophisticated techniques,
our method rejects significantly more proxies (10% more
on average when we experiment across multiple providers).
Possibly some of those proxies could be used after all, but we
do not want to attribute censorship to the wrong country by
accident, so we are being cautious.
Appendix C
Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders Scores
The international organization Freedom House, which pro-
motes civil liberty and democracy worldwide, issues a yearly
report on “freedom on the Net,” in which they rate 65 countries
on the degree to which online privacy and free exchange of
information online are upheld in that country [39]. Each country
receives both a numerical score and a three-way classification:
16 of the 65 countries are considered “free,” 28 are “partly
free,” and 21 are “not free.” Unfortunately, 33 of the countries
studied by ICLab are not included in this report.
The international organization Reporters Without Borders
(RWB) issues a similar yearly report on freedom of the press.
This report covers 189 countries and territories, including all
65 of the countries rated by Freedom House, and all 62 of
the countries studied by ICLab [68] Each country receives a
numerical score and a color code (best to worst: 16 countries
are coded white, 42 yellow, 59 orange, 51 red, and 21 black).
Press freedom is not the same as online freedom, and the
methodologies behind the two reports are quite different, but
the scores from the two reports are reasonably well correlated
(Kendall’s τ = 0.707, p ≈ 10−16). We used a simple linear
regression to map RWB scores onto the same scale as FH
scores, allowing us to label all of the countries studied by
ICLab as “free” (72), “partly free” (85), or “not free” (32) in
the same sense used by Freedom House.
Appendix D
Detailed censorship results
Table VI continues Table II (Section V), showing countries 6
through 15 in the same ranking, with the top three FortiGuard
categories among their censored URLs, and the percentages of
all their censored URLs within those categories.
Many of these countries censor only a few of the URLs on
the lists we tested, so Table VI may reflect biases of the test
lists, such as over-representation of the GAME, IT, NEWS, and
SEAR categories on both ATL and CLBL-G.
Table VI
Censorship by Test List and Category, continued. For each of the three types of test list we use (see Section III-C), the next ten countries performing the
most censorship of URLs from that country, the top three FortiGuard categories among their censored URLs (abbreviations defined in Table IV), and the
percentage of all censored URLs from that category. We only observe 14 countries to censor anything from CLBL-C.
Overall Alexa Global (ATL) Globally Sensitive (CLBL-G) Per-Country Sensitive (CLBL-C)
Country Category Pct. Country Category Pct. Country Category Pct. Country Category Pct.
Turkey PORN 40.2% Kenya ILL 28.1% India NEWS 10.3% South Korea PORN 16.7%
GAMB 16.6% PORN 25.0% ILL 9.2% NEWS 16.1%
NEWS 9.2% GAME 6.2% IT 8.0% SHOP 11.8%
Russia GAMB 23.4% Russia PORN 26.3% United States NEWS 8.0% China NEWS 46.1%
PORN 10.0% SHOP 21.0% IT 6.9% ORG 46.1%
NEWS 7.6% STRM 10.5% SEAR 6.3% RELI 7.7%
Uganda PORN 42.6% Japan SEAR 19.0% Uganda PORN 42.6% Hong Kong ORG 100.0%
ADUL 11.7% NEWS 9.5% ADUL 11.7%
LING 10.3% GAME 9.5% LING 10.3%
Netherlands NEWS 13.4% Netherlands ILL 15.3% Russia GAMB 39.4% Poland GAMB 100.0%
ILL 8.5% NEWS 15.3% PORN 14.9%
SEAR 8.5% SEAR 15.3% RELI 5.3%
Japan NEWS 11.0% Sweden SEAR 27.2% Netherlands NEWS 13.0% Singapore PROX 66.6%
GAME 9.6% BLOG 9.1% ILL 7.2% GAME 33.3%
SEAR 9.6% STRM 9.1% GAME 7.2%
Australia SEAR 15.4% Hong Kong STRM 20.0% Japan NEWS 11.5% Ukraine BLOG 75.0%
ILL 10.7% SEAR 20.0% GAME 9.8% NEWS 8.3%
NEWS 9.2% SHOP 10.0% ILL 6.5% IT 8.3%
Sweden GAME 10.3% Australia ILL 30.0% Australia SEAR 14.5% Malaysia PORN 100.0%
NEWS 10.3% SEAR 20.0% NEWS 10.9%
STRM 6.9% SHOP 10.0% ILL 7.2%
New Zealand GAME 11.5% New Zealand SEAR 20.0% Sweden GAME 10.6% Colombia ITRA 100.0%
HEAL 9.6% GAME 20.0% ILL 6.4%
SEAR 9.6% ILL 10.0% STRM 6.4%
China NEWS 17.0% United States SEAR 21.6% Hong Kong NEWS 10.9% Brazil SOLI 100.0%
ORG 12.7% NEWS 10.8% GAME 10.8%
SEAR 6.4% ILL 8.1% STRM 8.7%
Bulgaria ILL 11.6% China SEAR 33.3% New Zealand HEAL 9.5%
HEAL 9.3% GAME 16.6% GAME 9.5%
GAME 9.3% HEAL 16.6% NEWS 7.1%
HTML structure Visible message
ACK+PSH
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Content-Length: nnnn
Content-Type: text/html; charset="utf-8"
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN">
<html>
<head<title></title></head>
<body><h0><font color="black">
visible message
</font></h0></body></html>
“This URL has been blocked under instructions of a
competent Government Authority or in compliance with
the orders of a Court of competent jurisdiction.
***This URL has been blocked under Instructions of the
Competent Government Authority or Incompliance to
the orders of Hon’ble Court.*** [sic]
*“Error 403: Access Denied/Forbidden”*
404. That’s an error.
HTTP Error 404 - File or Directory not found
HTTP Error 404 - File or Directory not found = http://...
Fig. 10. Example cluster of block pages. All of the messages in the right-hand column were observed with the HTTP response headers and HTML structure
shown on the left.
The presence of countries such as Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United States in this table could indicate that
our detectors still have false positives, or that individual ISPs
and/or the VPN services we are using are blocking access to
certain sites. The latter is likely for the ILL category, which
includes many sites that facilitate copyright infringement.
Figure 10 shows an example group of block pages detected
by textual similarity clustering, including two variations on
the Indian legal jargon mentioned in Section IV-C, but
also messages mimicking generic HTTP server errors. This
demonstrates how similarity clustering can detect covert as
well as overt censorship.
